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In this paper, we use a unique dataset from the Korea Stock Exchange to examine the demand 
and supply schedules for common stocks.  Our dataset allows us to identify limit orders 
submitted by three types of investors: domestic individuals, domestic institutions, and foreign 
investors.  Using this feature, we investigate demand and supply elasticities across these three 
types of investors in general, and then study their changes around the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis.  To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first evidence that heterogeneous 
investors have differing demand and supply schedules and that the elasticities of different 
investor types are affected differently by a financial crisis.  
The textbook description of arbitrage requires no capital and involves no risk.  
Arbitrageurs short an overvalued security and use the proceeds to buy its perfect substitute.  
In this environment, competition among arbitrageurs leads to perfectly elastic demand and 
supply curves for individual securities.  However, in real stock markets, arbitrage does not 
work as effectively as the textbook description and the slopes of demand and supply curves 
are finitely elastic.1, 2 
Since Scholes (1972), the elasticities of demand and supply curves for common stocks 
have been a subject of extensive research.  In the past, researchers have used two approaches 
to measuring these elasticities. One approach is to examine price changes associated with 
stock issues or repurchases.  Another is to examine price changes of stocks added to market 
indexes.  In this paper, we propose a third approach – the direct construction of demand and 
supply curves for individual stocks from detailed data on individual bids and offers in the 
course of normal daily trading in both call auction and continuous markets.3     
 We do this using a dataset which consists of over 550 million buy and sell orders 
submitted in the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) for the period from December 1996 to 
December 2000.  The methodology we develop using this data allows us to probe into the 
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nature of demand and supply elasticity for stocks more deeply than previous studies in 
several ways.   
First, by constructing daily demand and supply schedules for all common stocks listed 
in the KSE, we are able to directly estimate the daily elasticity measures of demand and 
supply curves in a general trading environment.  Because the KSE opens with call auction 
and then switches to continuous trading, we estimate two measures of elasticity for both 
demand and supply curves.  We find that for the opening auction, the average (median) 
elasticity of demand is 9.26 (8.62) while it is 10.28 (8.85) for the continuous trading hours.  
We also obtain comparable estimates for the elasticity of supply.  Our estimates roughly fall 
in the middle of the spectrum of existing estimates based on the other two approaches.  
  Second, going beyond previous studies, our data let us investigate demand and supply 
schedules for different classes of investors.  When we partition the sample by investor class, 
we find that both domestic institutions and foreign investors (mainly institutional investors) 
have substantially more elastic demand and supply schedules than domestic individual 
investors.  This result indicates that institutional investors have more homogeneous 
expectations and are more responsive to changes in stock prices than are individual investors. 
Third, and also beyond the scope of previous studies, we can examine how elasticities 
change.  Since our sample period includes the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which led to sharp 
declines in stock prices in Korea and other countries in the region, we can examine the effect 
of this crisis on elasticities.  We find that the crisis permanently reduced the demand and 
supply elasticities of both domestic individuals and domestic institutions, but had virtually no 
effect on the elasticities of foreign investors. Notably, demand and supply elasticities of 
domestic individual investors fall by almost 50% from their pre-crisis levels. One possible 
explanation for this structural break can be found in an equally dramatic decrease in margin 
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trading (over 90% down from the pre-crisis level) which was exclusively used by domestic 
individuals before the crisis. 
Finally, we relate time-series variation in our elasticity measures to variables related 
to time-series variation in information heterogeneity, differences in opinion among investors, 
the availability of close substitutes, and resources for arbitrage.4  These variables include 
direct measures of information asymmetry among investors, intra-day volatility of returns, 
trading volume, and margin buying orders as a fraction of total buy orders submitted.  These 
variables are highly significantly associated with our elasticity measures and explain a large 
proportion of time-series variations in elasticity.    
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section I contains a short 
overview of the relevant literature.  Section II describes the data and elasticity estimation 
procedures.  Section III discusses the estimated elasticity measures.  In section IV, we discuss 
measures of information heterogeneity among investors and of resources for arbitrage.  
Regression results are provided in section V.  Section VI concludes the paper. 
 
I. The Nature of the Demand and Supply Curves for Individual Securities 
The demand curve for ketchup describes how the quantity of ketchup consumers buy 
rises as the price of ketchup falls, all else equal.  By all else equal, we typically mean no 
changes in the consumer’s wealth, tastes, or information about the naturopathic benefits of a 
high-ketchup diet; or in the prices of complements and substitutes, like hot dogs and mustard.  
When any of these factors do change, we speak of a shift in the demand curve, rather than a 
movement along it.   
In a famous satire, Summers (1985) likens asset pricing unto ketchup pricing.  
Pursuing this analogy, the demand curve for an individual stock describes how the quantity of 
shares investors demand rises as the price of the stock falls, all else equal.  Again, all else 
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equal means no changes in the investor’s wealth, tastes (including time preference, risk 
aversion, and the like), or information about the fundamental value of the stock, or in the 
prices of substitutes, such as other stocks.   
The elasticity of the demand curve for ketchup, like its position, depends on 
consumers’ wealth, tastes, information, and the availability of close substitutes.  The 
elasticity of the demand curve for a stock depends on the same factors.     
Wealthier investors might react differently to a given change in the stock’s price than 
would poorer investors.  For example, if a stock’s price falls to below what an investor 
perceives as its fundamental value, a wealthy investor buys heavily in the hopes of profiting 
when the price returns to its fundamental value.  A poorer investor, if unable to borrow freely, 
cannot do this.  Thus, all else equal, demand curves for stocks should be flatter if investors 
are wealthier.   
Likewise, investors with different tastes react differently to the same price change.  
For example, more risk adverse or less patient investors might be less willing to buy very 
large amounts of a stock they believe to be slightly undervalued.  Mitchell, Pulvino, and 
Staffford (2002) point out that arbitrage requires taking very large undiversified positions in a 
misvalued stock and holding those positions until the misvaluation is corrected.  This requires 
both risk tolerance (for other things might happen to change the price before it corrects) and 
patience (for the correction might not occur promptly).  Since greater investor risk aversion 
or less investor patience means that a given price decline induces less additional buying, they 
imply less elastic demand curves for individual stocks.   
If different people have different information, or opinions, about the fundamental 
value of a stock (or the true worth of a high-ketchup diet), the demand curve becomes less 
elastic.  This is because the range of possible equilibrium price becomes wider as the 
heterogeneity of investors’ expectation increases.  
 5
Heterogeneous information also determines the availability of close substitutes for 
any given stock.  If an investor invests costly resources to gather and process information 
about a given stock and determines, say, that it is deeply undervalued, he naturally buys as 
much of the stock as he can – even by bidding at higher prices than the current equilibrium 
price.  A small price increase does not induce him to stop buying the stock if it is still 
undervalued.  Only a large price hike that raises the price to equal or exceed the investor’s 
estimate of fundamental value can induce him to stop buying.  This is because other stocks, 
which the investor has not spent resources valuing, are not perfect substitutes for this stock, 
which he knows to be deeply undervalued.  An analogous story applies to supply curves.  
Thus, more heterogeneous information makes stocks more imperfect substitutes for each 
other, and consequently renders demand and supply curves for individual stocks more 
inelastic.   
In fact, in a pure exchange framework, like the stock market, supply depends on the 
same factors as demand, for without production, technology-related variables and factor costs 
are irrelevant. Thus, the supply curve for an individual stock shifts with investors’ wealth, 
tastes, and information, and with the prices of other stocks; and the same list of factors that 
determine the elasticity of demand also determine the elasticity of the supply curve.5    
Thus, at a technical level, the demand or supply curves for stocks seem not much 
different from the demand or supply curves for ketchup in a pure exchange economy.  
However, the critical differences between ketchup pricing and asset pricing are the 
commonplace assumptions in the latter that: 
1. At least some investors can borrow cash and stocks freely to buy under-valued stocks 
and short over-valued stocks without limit and are willing to do so.   That is, some investors 
have infinitely deep pockets and no risk aversion, and thus can freely engage in unlimited 
arbitrage trading. 
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2. There is no information heterogeneity.  That is, all investors, except insiders, have the 
same estimate of the fundamental value of all stocks.  Any deviation of the stock price from 
this value consequently leads to unlimited arbitrage trading, which quickly returns the price 
to its consensus value.   
3. All stocks are priced at their fundamental values.  The absence of information 
heterogeneity means that new information comes to all investors simultaneously.  This makes 
shares simply claims to future cash flows with different degrees of risk.  Consequently, every 
stock has numerous perfect substitutes – all other stocks and portfolios with the same level of 
risk.6   
These three interdependent assumptions render the demand and supply curves for 
individual stocks perfectly elastic, or horizontal.  In other words, if any of the above 
assumptions is violated, the perfect elasticity of demand and supply curves is not guaranteed.    
Scholes (1972) therefore stresses the importance of empirically verifying that the 
elasticities of demand and supply for individual stocks are very large.  To this end, he 
examines secondary offerings, and concludes that the associated stock price declines are due 
to information conveyed by firms’ decisions to issue shares, and do not imply inelastic 
investor demand or supply.  Mikkelson and Partch (1985) reexamine secondary equity 
distributions and find variables they expect to be related to the elasticity of demand for stocks 
insignificant in explaining the price impact of secondary offerings.  They consequently 
second Scholes’ conclusion.   
The first evidence for downward sloping demand curves is Shleifer (1986), who 
reports that a stock’s price rises permanently upon its inclusion in the Standard and Poor’s 
500 index (S&P 500).  Shleifer argues that, because index funds must buy such a stock, its 
demand curve mechanically shifts to the right.  If the demand curve were flat, this shift would 
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have no price impact. Shleifer therefore interprets his finding of a large and permanent price 
rise as evidence of imperfectly elastic demand curves for individual stocks.  
However, Harris and Gurel (1986) report that these price increases are temporary, and 
attribute them to temporary liquidity shortfalls associated with trading by index funds, rather 
than to downward sloping demand curves.  Other studies, including Jain (1987), Dhillon and 
Johnson (1991), Beneish and Whaley (1996), and Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) fail to 
replicate this finding.  Jain (1987) finds price increases in included firms’ bonds, and Dhillon 
and Johnson (1991) find price increases for stocks included in indexes that are not tracked by 
index funds. Consequently, they argue that the permanent price rise noted by Shleifer (1986) 
may result from a certification effect: addition to an index conveys positive information about 
a company’s future prospects. Furthermore, Denis et al. (2003) find that newly added firms to 
the S&P 500 index experience significant increases both in earnings per share forecasts and 
in realized earnings. They interpret these results as supporting the view that S&P 500 
inclusion is not an information free event.    
Nonetheless, other evidence regarding index demand supports Shleifer’s (1986) 
conclusions.  For example, Kaul et al. (2000) find permanent stock price changes associated 
with changes to the weights of firms in the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 Index.  Since no 
stocks are added to the index, and the weight changes are both preannounced and purely 
mechanical, a certification effect can be ruled out.  Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) find that 
price reactions to inclusion into the S&P 500 index are negatively related to the availability 
of close substitutes for included stocks. Since the lack of close substitutes hinders arbitrage 
activities, demand curves become more inelastic, resulting in large price impacts. Thus, the 
controversy is far from settled. 
 A second approach, assessing price elasticities using data from auctions, also favors 
finitely elastic demand and supply curves. Bagwell (1992) uses 32 Dutch auction stock 
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repurchases to estimate price elasticities of supply curves for individual securities.  She 
reports that repurchasing firms face upward-sloping supply curves for their shares, and that 
heterogeneity of valuations is the main cause for the shape of the supply curve.  Similarly, 
Kandel et al. (1999), using 27 Israeli initial public offerings (IPOs), directly estimate 
downward sloping demand curves for individual stocks.   
Moreover, studies that support the view that the demand and supply curves for 
common stocks are imperfectly elastic report differing elasticities.  For example, the imputed 
elasticites of demand reported by Kaul et al. (2000) and Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) are 
10.50 and 7.87, respectively.  In contrast, Bagwell (1992) reports a mean elasticity of 0.68; 
while Kandel et al. (1999) report a mean gross elasticity of 2.91 and a mean local elasticity of 
37.10. It should be, however, noted that Dutch auction repurchases and IPOs represent 
special corporate events.   
 
II. Empirical Framework and Data  
A. KSE Market Structure 
The KSE is an order-driven market.  The trading session starts at 9:00 and closes at 
15:00.7  Throughout the trading session, a trader may place either a limit order or a market 
order, which is directly transmitted to the KSE via the computerized order-routing system.  
The automated trading system of the exchange prioritizes each order by price and then by 
time.  The KSE opens with a call market and then switches to a continuous market.  In the 
opening auction, all bids and offers submitted are regarded as simultaneous and matched at a 
single price.8  Trading prices during the rest of trading hours are determined by continuous 
auction, whereby a new bid (offer) entered into the automated trading system is matched with 
any unfilled offers (bids).9  Like all other markets, the KSE has a minimum price increment 
(tick), which determines what prices traders use.  The size of the tick varies substantially 
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across stocks, depending on the price level.  For example, a stock priced at 5000 won trades 
on 5 won increments while a stock priced at 50,000 won trades on 50 won increments.10 
Market participants observe part of the limit order book.  During our sample period, 
from December 1996 to December 2000, the KSE made order sizes for the five lowest sell 
and five highest buy prices available to the public.11  The availability of this information lets 
traders partially observe the demand and supply schedules of each stock before they submit 
their own orders. 
 
B. Data 
Our basic data are from the KSE’s Trade and Quote (KSETAQ) records.  We include 
all common stocks listed in the KSE between December 1996 and December 2000, a total of 
49 months.   
The KSETAQ database provides detailed information on each order placed and each 
trade executed.  In addition to the price, order size, and time of arrival, this database contains 
detailed information regarding each order and each executed trade that is unavailable 
elsewhere.  First, the database tags each order as either a buy or a sell, and further classifies 
each buy or sell order as a market or limit order.  Second, it contains information about 
investor type.  With this information, we are able to distinguish between three types of 
investors: (a) domestic individuals, (b) domestic institutions, and (c) foreign investors.  Third, 
it has an indicator for a margin purchase or short sale order.  Finally, the KSETAQ data 
distinguishes orders in the call market auctions held at the opening from orders in the 
continuous trading that occurs during the remainder of each day.  The database provides this 
information on each order and on each trade executed.   
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Given these data, we construct the demand and supply schedules for each stock at the 
opening auction and during the rest of the day.  In addition, we examine differences in 
demand and supply schedules by investor type. 
 
Insert Table I about here 
  
Panels A and B of Table I summarize the distribution of the over 550 million orders 
submitted in the KSE during our sample period.  These orders are partitioned into buy and 
sell orders, and then sorted by order type (market versus limit orders), investor type (domestic 
individuals, domestic institutions, and foreign investors), and trading session (opening call 
market auction versus continuous trading during the rest of trading hours).  Most orders are 
limit orders (94.78 percents of buy orders and 92.99 percent of sell orders). In addition, 
individual investors dominate trading.  Specifically, individual investors submit 95.70 percent 
of buy orders and 95.34 percent of sell orders; while domestic institutions and foreign 
investors collectively submit only 4.30 percent of buy orders and only 4.66 percent of sell 
orders.12   However, individual investors’ orders are much smaller than those of domestic 
institutions and foreign investors.  Individual buy orders average only 1,217.09 shares, while 
those of domestic institutions average 3,568.22 shares and those of foreign investors average 
1,909.20 shares. Finally, 19.10 percent of buy orders and 21.14 percent of sell orders were 
submitted to the opening session. 
Panel C of Table I summarizes the distribution of our approximately 387 million trade 
records. As with orders, individual investors dominate actual transactions.  Specifically, 
90.05 percent of buyers and 89.69 percent of sellers are individual investors during our 
sample period. In contrast, domestic institutions and foreign investors collectively 
participated in about 10 percent of transactions.  This participation rate is actually 
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surprisingly high, because, as Panels A and B show, these investors submit less than 5 
percent of total orders during our sample period.  Panel C of Table I shows that the average 
trades by domestic institutions and foreign investors are larger than those of individual 
investors.  However, these average values may not reflect the actual differences in trade size 
across investor types because of the way orders map into transactions.  For example, if an 
order is submitted and executed in parts over the course of the trading session, the single 
order gives rise to several executions.  When this happens, the KSE reports each execution as 
a transaction.  Thus, the average trade sizes reported in Panel C of Table I understate actual 
trade sizes. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Figure 1 shows the time-series of the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) 
during our sample period. 
 
C. Elasticity Measures of Demand and Supply 
In estimating the slopes of demand and supply curves, we use a modification of the 
approach of Bagwell (1992).  Specifically, for the opening session and the rest of trading 
hours, we separately accumulate all limit orders submitted at or above (at or below) each 
price point to construct demand (supply) schedules.13   Then, all bid and ask prices are 
normalized such that the opening auction price (closing price) is 100 for demand and supply 
schedules of the opening auction (rest of trading hours).14  We also normalize quantity to 
measure the cumulative percentage of total quantity demanded or supplied during each 
trading session. Bagwell (1992) shows that this normalization of both prices and quantities 
allows a linear regression on levels to generate estimates of elasticities directly.15   
  Thus, for each trading day, the elasticities of demand and supply are estimated by 
running the following regression: 
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jkjkjjjk dp εβα ++=     (1) 
where jkp  and jkd  represent the normalized price and normalized market-wide cumulative 
quantity at tick point k for firm j.  At each normalized price level pjk, we sum bids from all 
investors to obtain the market’s demand for stock j.  Thus,  
∑ ∑= ≥= Ii p ijkjk npd 1 )()( π π           (2) 
where nijk(π) is the number of shares of stock j for which investor i bids price π in buy orders 
valid on a given day. We use regression (1) to estimate the inverse of (2), so the 
corresponding elasticity is approximated by the absolute value of the inverse of the slope 
coefficient; that is, 1−= jj βη .  We estimate (1) for each trading session, the opening call 
market and the continuous market operating for the rest of the day, for all stocks with at least 
five price-quantity pairs with nonzero quantities demanded.   We then repeat this procedure 
using offers instead of bids to estimate supply elasticities.16   That is,  
∑ ∑= ≤= Ii p ijkjk mps 1 )()( π π      (3) 
where mijk(π) is the number of shares of stock j for which investor i asks price π in sell orders 
valid on a given trading day.   
 As shown in Table I, the number of orders submitted for the opening auction is 
substantially smaller than that for the rest of trading hours.  This constrains our ability to 
estimate demand and supply elasticities by investor type for the opening auction.  
Consequently, we estimate the opening session slopes of demand and supply curves without 
considering different types of investors.  For the rest of each day’s trading hours, however, 
the elasticities of demand and supply are estimated separately for each investor type.17 
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III. Elasticities of Demand and Supply 
Panel A of Table II reports summary statistics for daily average elasticity of demand 
curves.18  The R-squared values of regression (1) average 82.55 percent for the opening 
auction and 77.40 percent for the rest of trading hours.  The mean (median) elasticity of 
demand is 9.26 (8.62) for the opening auction and 10.28 (8.85) for the rest of trading hours.  
This means demand for the average stock falls by 9.26% (10.28%) when its price rises by 1% 
during the opening auction (rest of trading hours).  Panel B of Table II shows elasticities of 
supply to be of comparable magnitudes.  Thus, we find that demand curves for individual 
stocks are downward sloping and supply curves for individual stocks are upward sloping.   
 
Insert Table II about here 
 
Our estimates of demand and supply elasticity roughly match the imputed elasticity of 
10.50 in Kaul et al. (2000), and slightly exceed the 7.89 estimate obtained by Wurgler and 
Zhuravskaya (2002).  However, our estimates greatly exceed the mean (median) elasticity of 
0.68 (1.05) reported by Bagwell (1992) for Dutch auction share repurchases.  Our elasticity 
estimates are also much larger than the mean (median) estimate of 2.91 (2.47) estimated by 
Kandel et al. (1999) using IPO price data.   One possible explanation of the differences is that 
we measure elasticities in the course of normal trading, while Bagwell (1992) and Kandel et 
al. (1999) measure elasticity at special corporate events.  Another possibility, mentioned 
earlier, is that investors in the KSE can observe the quantities demanded and supplied at the 
five best prices, whereas general investors elsewhere have much less information.  
 
A. Time-Series Patterns of Elasticity Measures 
Our sample period includes the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which led to substantial 
equity losses in Korea and other countries in the region.  During the crisis period, many 
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Korean investors lost considerable wealth.  From September 1997 to December 1997, the 
Korean won fell by 54% relative to the U.S. dollar - from 914.40 to 1695.00 won per dollar, 
while the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) dropped by almost 42% - from 
647.11 to 376.31.  Corporate bankruptcies and ensuing layoffs further eroded investor wealth.   
It also became more difficult for Koreans to borrow money (and presumably also to borrow 
stock for short sales).  For example, the yield on 91-day commercial paper in Korea rose from 
13.88% to 29.26% during the same 3-month period.19  Certainly, changing time preferences 
and risk aversion plausibly explain part of this rise.  Finally, it seems likely that investors 
acquired new information about Korean stocks through the crisis.  It is clear that these large 
changes in investor wealth, tastes, and information shifted demand and supply curves for 
individual stocks downward, for stock prices fell.  In this section, we explore whether 
elasticities of demand and supply also changed.   
We therefore break the sample into three sub-periods: (a) the pre-crisis period 
(December 1996 – October 1997), (b) the in-crisis period (November 1997 – October 1998), 
and (c) the post-crisis period (November 1998 – December 2000). 
 
Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here 
 
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) plot the time-series of the daily average demand elasticities.20  
They also show the number of firms used in calculating each of these values.  Figure 2(a) 
shows that the demand elasticity for the opening auction varies substantially over the sample 
period.  Demand becomes markedly less elastic in the latter part of the sample period.21  The 
figure also highlights an obvious structural break following the Asian financial crisis.  
Summary statistics of elasticity measures for the three sub-periods are listed in Panel A of 
Table II.  For the opening auction, the average demand elasticity is 13.27 in the pre-crisis 
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period, but only 7.08 in the post-crisis period.  Thus, the magnitude of demand elasticity falls 
46% in absolute value with the crisis, and this difference in the elasticity (6.19) is significant 
at the one percent level.  Figure 2(b) and Panel A of Table II show a similar pattern in 
demand elasticity for the rest of trading hours, and the decline is likewise highly significant.   
 Figures 3(a) and 3(b) exhibit the time-series patterns of supply elasticity and the 
numbers of firms used each trading day in estimating these elasticity measures, while Panel B 
of Table II presents summary statistics for the three sub-periods.  Mimicking the pattern in 
demand elasticities, supply curves are significantly less elastic after the 1997 financial crisis. 
 
B. Opening-Auction Elasticity versus Rest-of-Day Elasticity 
All orders submitted during the opening auction are regarded by the KSE as 
simultaneous and are matched at a single price.  Kalay et al. (2001) argue that auctions of this 
type provide a natural environment for investigating the demand and supply curves of 
individual common stocks because the confounding effects of new information are minimal. 
However, the smaller number of orders submitted to the opening auction constrains our 
ability to examine demand and supply elasticities by investor type.  In contrast, the greater 
number of orders typically submitted during the rest of trading hours lets us compare 
elasticities for different classes of investors, but allows the criticism that demand and supply 
curves may shift as new information arrives.  Thus, estimating elasticities using data for the 
rest of trading hours imposes a stationarity assumption, which may be inappropriate. 
To investigate the appropriateness of the stationarity assumption, we partition the 
sample into quintiles on the basis of the percentage of orders cancelled or revised during each 
trading day.  We take a large number of such revisions and cancellations as indicative of 
shifts in the demand or supply curves during a given day.  Table III reports regressions of our 
opening elasticities on the elasticities for the rest of trading hours for each quintile.22   
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Table III about here 
 
Panel A shows the two demand elasticity estimates to be highly significant, and the 
adjusted R-squared values to exceed 80 percent in all five sub-samples.  Although the 
regression coefficient monotonically decreases with the percentage of cancelled or revised 
orders, the difference between the first and fifth quintile estimates is only about fifteen 
percent of their average magnitude.  Thus, our results strongly suggest that the opening-
auction and rest-of-trading-hour elasticities measure the same underlying phenomenon.  The 
results in Panel B show a similar pattern in the supply elasticity estimates.  Overall, the 
results in Table III justify that the assumption of the within-day stationarity is a reasonable 
first approximation, but indicate grounds for some caution as well.23 
 
C. Investor Types and Time-Series Patterns of Elasticity  
 Prior studies of demand and supply elasticities for individual securities (e.g., Bagwell 
(1992) and Kandel et al. (1999)) do not distinguish different types of investors.  However, 
other research suggests possible systematic differences between different investor categories.   
 First, traders with higher quality information should probably be both more certain 
about fundamental securities values than less informed traders and more in agreement with 
each other.  Thus, all else equal, more informed traders should have more elastic demand and 
supply curves for individual securities.  Second, traders with deeper pockets should have 
more elastic demand and supply curves for individual stocks.  This is because rapidly rising 
margin and short sale costs prevent traders without deep pockets from taking very large 
positions, even when they are very sure of their estimates of fundamental values.  Therefore, 
to distinguish investors who might have different elasticities, we consider categories of 
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investors who might have different quantities and qualities of information, and who might 
have pockets of differing depth.   
One such categorization distinguishes institutional investors from individuals.  
Certainly, institutions have deeper pockets than all but the wealthiest individuals.   
Also, much recent work suggests different information behind the trades of 
institutions and individuals.  Lev (1988) argues that institutional investors have a lower 
marginal cost of gathering information and are generally better informed than individual 
investors.  Kim and Verrecchia (1994) and Cohen et al. (2002) propose that institutional 
investors possess superior information processing ability. Shiller and Pound (1989) report 
that institutional and individual investors differ as to how they acquire information.  
Specifically, institutions typically do formal investment analyses and have access to costly 
databases.   These considerations suggest that institutional orders and trades might be more 
homogeneous and carry more information than those by individuals.  
 However, Lakonishok et al. (1991, 1992) posit that institutional fund managers 
engage in a range of trading activities motivated by herding, window dressing, and the like. 
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) provide a theoretical framework where concerns for reputation 
generate herding driven by a ‘share the blame’ effect among managers. Dennis and Strickland 
(2002) find some evidence for herding by mutual and pension fund managers in the U.S. 
stock market. Herding might make institutional trading appear uninformed. Nonetheless, 
insitutional investors’ opinions might still be homogeneous around prices where herding 
occurs.  Determining whether individuals or institutions possess more information is beyond 
the scope of this paper, though we plan further work in this direction.  Here, our concern is 
which sort of investor makes more homogeneous valuations.  
 Another categorization distinguishes domestic investors from foreign investors.  The 
depth of domestic investors’ pockets should vary with the health of the domestic economy.  
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In contrast, the depth of foreigners’ pockets should vary with the health of the world 
economy.   Also, following Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad who famously 
blamed the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s on fad-driven foreign investors, much research 
has focused on whether foreign investors are more, less, or differently informed than 
domestic investors.  Using Finish data, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) find foreign investors 
typically taking opposite trades to those of domestic institutional and individual investors.  
Seaholes (2000) presents evidence that foreign investors in Thailand and Taiwan also tend to 
trade against domestic institutional and individual investors.  In contrast, Choe, Kho, and 
Stulz (1999) show that foreign investors in Korea behave much like domestic institutions but 
not individuals during the Asian financial crisis.  Thus, the extent to which foreign investors 
behave differently from domestic investors is still incompletely understood, and which is 
better informed remains an open question. 
Because the KSE database identifies trader type for each order submitted, it allows us 
to examine the behavior of different investor classes.  Specifically, we break our sample of 
limit orders submitted during each day’s continuous trading into three groups: (a) orders 
submitted by domestic individuals, (b) orders submitted by domestic institutions, (c) orders 
submitted by foreign investors. 24, 25  Then, we estimate the elasticity of demand and supply 
for each investor class.  This analysis provides a sense of how the supply and demand 
schedules of these investors differ and of how they change around the Asian financial crisis.   
 
Insert Table IV and Figure 4 about here 
 
Table IV presents summary statistics of daily average elasticity measures for each 
investor class.  Panel A indicates that the elasticity of demand for common stocks differs 
substantially across different classes of investors.  Individual investors have a mean (median) 
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elasticity of 10.44 (8.96), which is significantly lower than the 18.90 (18.88) and 21.77 
(21.46) estimates for domestic institutions and foreign investors, respectively.  Because 
foreign investors in Korea are predominantly institutional investors, our findings suggest that 
institutional investors’ demand is much more sensitive to price changes than is that of 
individual investors. Panel B of Table IV reports similar results for supply elasticities. These 
findings suggest that institutions as a group have more homogeneous valuations than 
individual investors have. Our findings also indicate that foreign investors’ elasticities of 
demand and supply resemble those of domestic institutions, not those of individual investors.  
This is consistent with Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999).   
Figures 4(a) and 4(b) reveal that the elasticities of different classes of investors 
change differently over time.  The demand and supply curves of individual investors become 
much less elastic following the 1997 crisis.  In Panel A of Table IV, the mean elasticity of 
demand for domestic individual investors falls almost 50 percent (from 15.83 to 7.96), and 
this change is statistically significant at the one percent level.  The mean elasticity of demand 
for domestic institutions simultaneously falls less - by 24 percent (from 22.63 to 17.17).  
However, the mean elasticity of demand for foreign investors hardly changes - from 22.00 in 
the pre-crisis period to 21.77 in the post-crisis period.  Panel B shows that the elasticities of 
supply for these three categories of investors change in much the same ways. 
Overall, Table IV and Figure 4 show intriguing differences in behavior among 
different classes of investors that have not been documented in the previous literature.   We 
show that both domestic and foreign institutional investors have substantially more elastic 
demand and supply schedules than individual investors.  This result implies that a small 
change in an individual stock’s price results in a much larger change in institutional 
investors’ demand and supply than in individual investors’ demand and supply.  We also 
show that the Asian financial crisis affected domestic and foreign investors differently.  
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While it sharply reduced the demand and supply elasticities of domestic investors, it did not 
alter foreign investors behavior in any meaningful way. 
 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
 
Domestic institutions and foreign investors might mainly trade certain high profile 
firms, for example large firms.  Thus, our results might be driven by a firm size effect or 
some other anomaly associated with a specific type of firm.26  To check this possibility, we 
repeat our empirical analysis using a restricted sample of firm-days that have elasticity 
measures for all three investor categories.  However, Figure 5 shows that the time-series 
patterns for this restricted sample are similar to those in Figure 4. 
 
IV. Potential Determinants of Time-Series Variations in Demand and Supply 
Elasticities  
Section III showed a structural break in the magnitude of demand and supply 
elasticities around the time of the Asian financial crisis.  However, there is also substantial 
variation within each sub-period.  This section considers factors that might underlie the time-
series variation in elasticities by constructing proxies for the time-series variation in 
information heterogeneity (or differences of opinion) and available resources for arbitrage.  
We then check how strongly the time-series variation of each proxy is correlated with the 
time-series variation of our demand and supply elasticities 
First, we construct three proxies for the heterogeneity of investors’ private 
information (and/or difference in opinion) about individual stocks. These are: (a) the 
asymmetric information component of bid-ask spreads, (b) intraday volatility, and (c) share 
turnover.  Second, we use the ratio of margin buy orders to total buy orders submitted to 
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proxy for the vigor of arbitrage activity.  These variables derive from individual orders 
submitted (i.e., the asymmetric information component of the spread and the ratio of margin 
buy orders to total buy orders) or transactions executed (i.e., the intraday volatility and share 
turnover) for each firm each day. Finally, we calculate cross-sectional averages for each 
variable on each trading day to generate aggregated time-series variables. Detailed 
discussions of these variables are provided below. 
 
A. Adverse Selection Component the Bid-Ask Spread 
Information asymmetry models in the market microstructure literature assume two 
types of investors: informed traders and liquidity traders.  Informed traders trade because they 
have private information, while liquidity traders trade for reasons other than superior 
information.  Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and Easley and 
O’Hara (1987) suggest that liquidity traders sustain losses from trading with informed 
traders.  Thus, the presence of informed traders increases information asymmetry among 
market participants, who consequently include an adverse selection cost in the bid-ask spread 
to cover their expected losses to informed traders.   
The existence of privately informed traders can be measured by the magnitude of this 
adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread. As discussed in Kandel et al. (1999), 
greater asymmetry of information should induce less elastic demand curves.   Thus, we 
expect demand curves to be more inelastic when the adverse selection component of the 
spread is higher.  In addition, as bid-ask spreads increase, traders incur greater trading costs, 
further limiting arbitrage activities, and thereby rendering demand and supply curves even 
more inelastic.   
To investigate the effect of private information heterogeneity on the elasticities of 
demand and supply, we decompose bid-ask spreads into realized half-spreads and adverse 
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selection components using the method of Huang and Stoll (1996).  The realized half-spread 
represents the post-trade revenues earned by liquidity providers while the adverse selection 
component reflects the amount lost by liquidity providers to informed traders.  We define the 
spread as the difference between the prevailing lowest ask and highest bid prices.27  To 
estimate the realized-half spread, we first identify each trade as either buyer- or seller-
initiated.  The realized half-spread for time horizon τ is 
tt TradeTradeSpreadHalfRealized −=− +τ   (4) 
for a seller-initiated trade and 
( )tt TradeTradeSpreadHalfRealized −−=− +τ              (5) 
for a buyer-initiated trade, where tTrade is the transaction price at time t and τ+tTrade is the 
transaction price at t + τ.  In estimating realized half-spreads, we set τ equal to five minutes.28  
The adverse selection component of the spread is then the difference between the bid-ask 
spread and the realized half-spread.  Because the bid-ask spread is highly dependent on the 
tick size, which, in turn, depends on the price level, we use a relative measure of the spread: 
the bid-ask spread divided by the mid-point of the prevailing bid and ask prices.  
 
B. Intra-day Volatility 
French and Roll (1986) and Roll (1988) show that much of the variation in individual 
stock returns is firm-specific and unrelated to public announcements.  Roll (1988) argues that 
stock price movements are therefore largely caused by investors trading on private firm-
specific information.  Higher volatility thus represents more active trading by informed 
arbitrageurs, and consequently, reflects a more heterogeneous distribution of private 
information across investors. Thus, periods of higher volatility should accompany periods of 
inelastic demand and supply curves.  However, higher volatility, though due to informed 
trading by one set of arbitrageurs, makes the stock appear riskier to other potential 
 23
arbitrageurs.29  Since arbitrageurs often hold less than fully diversified portfolios, higher 
volatility makes them reluctant to take large positions even if they believe the stock to be 
mispriced.  This effect can be strong, especially if arbitrageurs have short horizons, as in 
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) or Shleifer and Vishny (1997).  
 We estimate the intraday volatility for each stock and each trading day as the standard 
deviation of 5-minute returns, which are measured using the mid points of bid and ask prices.  
 
C. Share Turnover  
Karpoff (1986) notes that trading occurs when investors disagree about fundamental 
values.  This presumably happens when different investors have access to different private 
information, or simply have different opinions.  Thus, trading volume arguably measures the 
heterogeneity of expectations among investors, and periods of high trading volume should 
also be periods of inelastic demand and supply curves.  
On the other hand, large trading volume could represent extensive liquidity-driven 
trading by uninformed investors.  In this case, periods with larger trading volume should also 
be periods of lower trading cost for arbitrageurs and thus of more elastic demand and supply 
curves. Which of these effects dominates is an empirical question. 
   We measure trading volume as the number of shares traded divided by the total 
number of outstanding shares.  
 
D. Margin Buying and Short Sales 
The KSE data used in this study allow us to identify each margin buying or short sale 
order placed.  Hence, we can investigate how margin buying and short sale activities affect 
the elasticities of demand and supply.  Specifically, we might consider the ratios of margin 
buying and short sale orders to total buy and sell orders placed, respectively, as possible 
 24
proxies for the arbitrage activities of informed buyers (sellers) who affect supply (demand) 
elasticity.  However, as discussed in the following section, short sales are quite rare - less 
than 0.5% of total sell orders.  Thus, we focus on the effect of margin buying orders on 
elasticities.  
Also, a caveat must be inserted at this point.  Two types of investors might engage in 
margin trading: arbitrageurs and optimistic noise traders.  Both sorts of margin traders should 
place buy orders around the current market price, and this should flatten the demand curve.30  
Thus, even if we cannot identify the primary users of margin trading,31 increased margin 
trading should be associated with more elastic demand curves.  
Analogous links connect margin trading and the elasticity of the supply curves of 
individual stocks. One such link is through arbitrage: observing increased demand at the 
current market price, potential sellers might infer that buyers possess private information and 
therefore adjust their own expectations accordingly. This would concentrate new sell orders 
around a new equilibrium price level, flattening the supply curve. A second such link derives 
from the market timing ability of buyers, which may play an important role in the KSE. As 
discussed above, the KSE released information on the quantities demanded (supplied) at the 
five highest (lowest) prices during our sample period.  This means traders partially observe 
the demand and supply schedules of each stock before they make trading decisions.  Thus, 
buyers (both arbitrageurs and irrationally optimistic investors) might prefer to place their 
orders where they observe the supply curve to be relatively flat. 
Two important institutional issues affect margin buying during our sample period.  
First, during the Asian crisis, most KSE stocks fell sharply, and many investors failed to meet 
the margin requirements.  To guard themselves against increased default risks, brokerage 
houses took various measures.  In December 1997, the Korea Securities Finance Corporation 
stopped lending money to brokerage firms, which borrow it to extend credit to individual 
 25
investors.32   In addition, brokerage firms increased their collateral requirement from 140 
percent to, on average, 174 percent and hiked their initial margin from 40 percent to 70 
percent.33  These changes make it more difficult for traders to exploit arbitrage opportunities 
and raised the probability of arbitrageurs being forced to unwind their positions prematurely 
and thereby incur losses.  Financial analysts in Korea suggest that these changes impeded 
arbitrage in the stock market.34  As will be discussed, we suspect that this policy change is 
partly responsible for the structural break that we observe in our elasticity measures. 
Second, all of our short sale orders and 99.99% of our margin purchase orders are 
from individual investors.  Thus, margin orders mainly either gauge arbitrage by individual 
investors or reflect the optimistic sentiment of individual investors. If this result carries across 
to other stock markets, margin trades may be a useful general proxy for trading by individuals 
– at least in the absence of institutional changes that alter the availability of margin financing.  
 
E. Time-series Patterns of Potential Determinants of Elasticity 
 
Insert Table V and Figure 6 here 
 
 
Table V presents summary statistics of the potential determinants of elasticity listed 
above, while Figure 6 plots their time-series patterns.  All values reported are based on cross-
sectional averages for each trading day.   
The adverse selection cost of buy orders (AdvCost-Buy) and of sell orders (AdvCost-
Sell) display similar time-series patterns.  Both variables are substantially higher during the 
in-crisis period than either before or after it.  They also move together, with a correlation 
coefficient of 0.935.  We can interpret the adverse selection variables as indicating that 
heterogeneity in the private information possessed by investors rose sharply during the crisis, 
and then fell back following it.  
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Like adverse selection costs, intra-day volatility (Volat) increases in the in-crisis 
period and falls back, though not quite to its pre-crisis level, in the third period.  Again, this 
suggests much more heterogeneous information during the crisis, but only somewhat more 
heterogeneous information following it.   
In contrast, trading volume (Volume) rises after the crisis.  However, this increase in 
post-crisis trading volume comes with greater volatility. The magnitude of standard deviation 
of post-crisis period is more than four times larger than that of pre-crisis period. 
Margin buying and short selling fall off dramatically around the start of Asian 
financial crisis.  As Table V suggests, margin trading was about 20% of total buy orders 
before the crisis, but decreases to a mere 1% after the crisis.  On the other hand, short sales 
were never widely used in the KSE, constituting about 0.5% of total sell orders before the 
crisis and becoming almost negligible after it.    
The time-series patterns of each variable are interesting per se, since they encapsulate 
the stock market’s condition before, during, and after the crisis.  As noted above, the 
structural break in elasticities cannot be explained by an increase in the asymmetric 
information cost portion of spreads or by an increase in intraday volatility after the crisis.  
This is because both variables revert to their pre-crisis level, while the elasticities do not.  The 
upward trend in trading volume could partly be explained by declining transactions costs due 
to wider use of the internet and mobile phones for stock market investing. This story got 
some empirical support in our data since post-crisis standard deviation of trading volume is 
much larger than that of pre-crisis period.  However, Table II shows that standard deviations 
of elasticities for the rest of the trading day actually decreased a lot (about 45% from the pre-
crisis level) in our data.  On the contrary, a dramatic change in the magnitude of margin 
trading does correspond to the structural break in the elasticity measures.  The structural 
break is most eminent in demand and supply elasticities of domestic individuals and margin 
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trading is exclusively used by domestic individuals before the crisis. Thus, the underlying the 
observed changes in demand and supply elasticities around the crisis appear limited to this 
change in margin interest along with the obvious decrease in the wealth of Korean investors 
due to the crisis, a possible increase in their risk aversion, and a possible increase in their 
perception of the risk in the stock market 
 
V. Regression Results 
Section III showed that the elasticities of demand and supply change substantially 
over our sample period. Section IV considered variables that might capture the heterogeneity 
of expectations among investors, and hence the potential for arbitrage.  To investigate the 
effect of these variables on the elasticities of demand and supply, we estimate the following 
regressions: 
 
Model 1: ttttt tbMrgbVolumebAdvCostbb εη +++++= 54310  (6) 
and 
Model 2: ttttt tbMrgbVolumebVolatbb υη +++++= 54320  (7) 
 
We include a time trend variable t in the regressions to correct for possible time trends in 
variables.  All variables other than the time trend variable are averaged across all firms each 
trading day to obtain daily aggregate measures.  Then, they are transformed by adding one 
and taking natural logarithms.  When the dependent variable is the elasticity of demand 
(supply), the adverse selection cost is calculated using buy (sell) orders only. 
Several comments on the specification of our regression model are in order. 
First, our regression specification is partly motivated by the fact that the correlation 
between demand and supply elasticities is surprisingly high, suggesting that common factors 
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might affect both. The correlation between demand and supply elasticities for the opening 
auction is 0.82 while that of the rest of the day is 0.71. 
Second, in our sample period, the adverse selection cost measures (AdvCost) and 
intra-day volatility (Volat) are highly correlated.35  This is not surprising, for these variables 
both reflect the local price impact of trading.  To mitigate any multicollinearity problem, we 
estimate Model 1 and Model 2 separately, instead of including both adverse selection cost 
and intra-day volatility as independent variables in a single regression model. 
Third, our specification investigates the contemporaneous relationship between 
elasticities and each variable over our sample period.  Thus we do not attempt to address 
causality between our variables. This is partly because our elasticity measures are aggregated 
to a daily level, and so cannot address causality relationships that are probably only 
detectable at the intraday level.   
All t-statistics are adjusted for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity using the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure of Newey and West (1987). 
 
Insert Table VI about here 
 
 Panel A of Table VI provides results from the time-series regression of the elasticity 
of demand - both over the entire sample period and by sub-period.  For the entire sample 
period, the estimated coefficients on all the independent variables are highly significant at the 
one percent level.  The coefficient on AdvCost is negative.  Thus, as the extent of information 
heterogeneity increases among traders, their expectations diverge and the demand curve 
becomes less elastic.  The intraday volatility (Volat) is also negatively related to the elasticity 
of demand.  This is consistent with large price movements reflecting the capitalization of 
private information possessed by informed traders who act as first movers. 
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The estimated Volume coefficient is also negative in both models, so higher volume 
corresponds to more inelastic demand and supply curves for individual stocks. Finally, the 
coefficient on Mrg is positive, implying that margin orders tend to cluster around a price level 
(most plausibly the market price), thus increasing the elasticity of the demand schedule.   
The leftmost columns of Panel B of Table VI present analogous time-series regression 
results for the elasticity of supply for the entire sample period.  The results are very similar to 
those of elasticity of demand. The only exception is that the coefficient on Volume in Model 
2 is positive, but insignificant. 
 However, caution is warranted in interpreting the regression results over the entire 
sample period.  The time-series plots of elasticity measures and their determinants shown in 
Figure 6 strongly suggest a structural break at the time of the financial crisis.  We therefore 
re-estimate Model 1 and Model 2 by sub-period.  Again, we use three sub-periods:  the pre-
crisis period of December 1996 to October 1997, the in-crisis period of November 1997 to 
October 1998, and the post-crisis period of November 1998 to December 2000.   
The remaining columns of Panel A of Table VI describe time-series regressions of 
elasticity of demand by sub-period.  The coefficients on AdvCost, Volat, and Volume have the 
same signs in each sub-period as in the entire sample, and almost all the coefficients remain 
significant at the one percent level.  The main difference is that the estimated coefficient on 
Mrg, is insignificant in the pre-crisis period in Model 1.  
The remaining columns of Panel B of Table VI report time-series regressions of 
elasticity of supply by sub-period.  As with the results for the elasticity of demand, the 
coefficients are generally significant at the one percent level and have consistent signs across 
the three sub-periods.  The only exception is the coefficient on Volume.  This coefficient is 
negative and significant in the pre-crisis period for both Model 1 and Model 2, but is 
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insignificant in both the in-crisis and post-crisis period (Model 1) or significantly positive, 
especially in the in-crisis period (Model 2).   
As discussed in Section IV.C, trading volume has two conflicting linkages with 
elasticity.  Trading volume rises if investors disagree more, implying a negative effect on 
elasticity.  However, a rise in trading volume can also increase elasticity because arbitrage is 
easier in a deeper market.  Our negative Volume coefficient may imply that the former effect 
dominates the latter in the pre-crisis period, while they wash or reverse in importance in the 
in-crisis and post-crisis periods.  The positive coefficient in Model 2 is large and significant, 
especially during the crisis period. If investors were forced to sell shares during this period 
for liquidity reasons, volume might be positively associated with supply elasticity. 
 It is interesting to note that, even though the margin trading variable falls on average 
by over ninety percent from the first to the third period, its effects on demand and supply 
elasticities still remain positive and significant after the crisis. 
 
VI. Conclusions  
Using over 550 million limit orders submitted in the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE), 
we investigate the demand and supply schedules for common stocks across heterogeneous 
investor types in general, and then study their changes around the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  
To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first evidence that different investor types have 
differing elasticities and that their demand and supply schedules are affected differently by a 
financial crisis. 
We find that domestic institutions and foreign investors (mainly institutional 
investors) have substantially more elastic demand and supply curves than domestic 
individuals. This result implies that institutions and foreigners have more homogeneous 
beliefs than domestic individuals, and consequently have more price sensitive demand and 
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supply schedules for common stocks.  The proportion of ownership held by institutional 
investors has increased in almost every stock market during the last two decades.  Although 
we do not address causality issues directly, our empirical findings raise the possibility that the 
increased presence of institutional investors increases the price elasticity of demand and 
supply for common stocks. However, whether homogeneity among institutional investors 
represents rational valuation of securities or reputation-driven herding remains unclear. 
 Our sample period includes the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which led to sharp 
declines in stock prices in many Asian countries.  Partitioning the sample into pre-, in-, and 
post-crisis sub-periods, we present evidence that the crisis affected different sorts of investors 
differently. Specifically, domestic investors’ demand and supply curves became dramatically 
less elastic following the crisis, while the crisis had virtually no effect on those of foreign 
investors. For example, both demand and supply elasticities of domestic individual reduce by 
almost 50% from the pre-crisis level. Sharp decreases in the elasticity measures for domestic 
investors after the crisis could be due to a reduction in their available resources for arbitrage 
caused by restrictions on margin trading and decreases in investors’ wealth. This asymmetric 
result also demonstrates that, even if domestic investors are affected by a country-specific (or 
region-specific) shock, foreign investors, presumably because of greater diversification in 
their portfolios, can continue trading and help restore normalcy in the local stock market.  
We also find that variables that capture a higher degree of heterogeneity among 
investors, the lack of close substitutes, and arbitrage risk are associated with more inelastic 
demand and supply curves. The adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread (which 
measures the impact of private information possessed by a subset of investors and/or the 
availability of close substitutes), intraday volatility (which reflects the heterogeneity of 
opinions among investors and/or arbitrage risk for less than fully diversified arbitrageurs) and 
trading volume are significantly negatively related with the magnitude of elasticities.  
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In passing, we also note that margin trading is almost exclusively an activity of 
individual investors.  Thus, margin trading might be a useful proxy for individual investor 
activity in markets that, unlike the Korean Stock Exchange, do not separate trades by the two 
classes of investors.   
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Footnotes 
                                                 
1 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Shiller (2002) suggest various reasons as to why arbitrage 
may not work as effectively as the textbook description. 
2 See Loderer, Cooney, and Van Drunen (1991) for detailed discussions on why demand and 
supply curves are finitely elastic in real stock markets. 
3 Kalay et al. (2001) also directly measure demand and supply elasticities for common stocks 
listed on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange.  However, they do not examine differences in 
elasticities across different investor types or changes in elasticities over time. 
4  We are investigating the cross-sectional and intraday patterns of demand and supply 
elasticities in another paper. 
5 The above example shows the possibility of the existence of common factors that affect 
both demand and supply elasticities in the same direction in a pure exchange economy. This 
partly motivates our regression specification in section V.  
6 This is strictly true of classical portfolio theory.  Other treatments of asset pricing, such as 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), allow finitely elastic demand curves.   
7 Before May 19, 2000, the KSE held two trading sessions: a morning session (from 9:00 
through 12:00) and an afternoon session (from 13:00 through 15:00). 
8 Orders not filled completely during the opening auction are passed on to the continuous 
auction unless they are cancelled or revised. 
9 During the last 10 minutes of the day, no trades and orders are collected for the closing 
batch auction at 15:00.  For a more complete description of the KSE market structure, see 
Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999). 
10 Complete information on minimum price variation is available on the KSE website 
(http://www.kse.org.kr). 
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11 Starting January 2001, traders observe order quantities for the ten lowest sell and ten 
highest buy prices. 
12 Trading by domestic institutions and foreign investors is concentrated on large companies.  
For example, almost 13 percent of buy and sell orders for Samsung Electronics, the largest 
company in Korea, are by these investors.  Their orders account for almost 55 percent of 
quantities demanded and 49 percent of quantities supplied.  They account for about 53 
percent of Samsung shares traded. 
13 In estimating the elasticity of demand and supply, we use limit orders only because market 
orders, by definition, do not specify prices. 
14 We have repeated the empirical analysis normalizing demand and supply schedules of the 
rest of trading hours by the opening auction price.  This alternative specification does not 
change our results. 
15 Regressions of logarithms of raw prices on those of raw quantities generate similar patterns 
to those shown in the tables, as described in footnote 18.    
16  The average number of price-quantity points for opening auction demand (supply) 
schedules is 19 (19). The average number for the rest of the day demand (supply) schedules is 
26 (27).    
17 For the rest of trading hours, we implicitly assume that the demand and supply curves are 
stable within a trading day.  In Section III.B, we empirically investigate the validity of this 
stationarity assumption. 
18 As a robustness check, we estimate elasticities using the alternative regression specification 
( ) ( ) jkjkjjjk pq εχδ ++= loglog , where jkp is the price corresponding to tick point k, jkq is the 
market-wide cumulative quantity demanded (supplied) at or above (at or below) the tick point 
k, and the absolute value of jχ  is the elasticity of demand (supply) for firm j on a given 
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trading day.  The estimated elasticities from this approach are highly correlated with those 
described in the Tables.  The correlation coefficients of the estimated elasticities are 0.775 for 
opening session demand and 0.768 for opening session supply.  In addition, the pattern of 
signs and significance levels in all our results are preserved when we use these alternate 
elasticity measures.  Consequently, we report the results based on the modified Bagwell 
approach in the paper.  
19 In addition, it became extremely difficult to buy on margin after the crisis, which further 
limited the amount of available money for stock investing. We look closely at changes in 
margin buying practices around the crisis in section IV.D.  
20 As discussed in Section II.C, we estimate the elasticity for each firm-day only if there are 
at least five different price points with non-zero quantities demanded.  Figures 1(a) and 1(b) 
suggest that the numbers of firms satisfying this requirement are generally stable over the 
sample period.  A sharp decline in the number of firms is evident in a brief window during 
the crisis.   
21  The time series of median values of elasticity closely resembles that of the means.  
Repeating our empirical analyses using median elasticities generates similar patterns of signs 
and statistical significance.   
22 We have repeated our analysis using individual firm-day elasticity measures instead of the 
daily average values.  Although this approach reduces the adjusted R-squared values, overall 
inferences of the regressions are similar to those in Table III. 
23 In addition to the percentage of orders cancelled or revised, other variables such as the 
absolute price change from the opening to the closing of the market, trading volume, and 
intraday volatility may serve as indicative of shifts in the demand or supply curves during a 
given day.  Repeating the analysis in Section III.B using these variables generates empirical 
results qualitatively similar to those reported in Table III. 
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24 The number of orders submitted during the opening auction is substantially smaller than 
that for the rest of trading hours. Especially, domestic institution and foreign investors rarely 
place orders in the opening auction.  This constrains our ability to estimate elasticity 
measures by investor type for the opening auction. 
25 Foreign investors in Korea are mainly institutional investors such as mutual funds and 
pension funds. 
26 We find that demand and supply curves are more elastic for large firms than they are for 
small firms.  During our sample period, the mean value of demand elasticities (supply 
elasticities) is 10.97 (9.90) for firms in the 5th size quintile for the rest of trading hours while 
it is 8.78 (8.17) for firms in the 1st size quintile. 
27 In an order-driven market, it is not possible to place a buy (sell) order above (below) the 
prevailing lowest ask (highest bid) price.  As a result, the effective spread is always the same 
as the quoted spread. 
28 We have repeated the empirical analysis using τ = 30 minutes.  This does not affect our 
results in any meaningful way. 
29  Mitchell et al. (2002) and Baker and Savasoglu (2002) find that idiosyncratic risk is 
responsible for limited arbitrage. 
30 Baker and Stein (2002) develop a model where high liquidity (elastic demand and supply 
curves) is a symptom of a predominance of irrationally optimistic investors.  
31 If margin trading is mainly used by rational arbitrageurs, the market price converges to the 
fundamental value of the firm. On the contrary, if margin trading is used by noise traders with 
an optimism bias, the market price could end up higher than the true value of the firm - a 
bubble. In the former case, we ought not to observe a price reversal, while in the latter case 
we should observe an eventual price reversal. However, as De Bondt and Thaler (1985) 
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show, the price reversal may happen quite gradually.  This fact limits our ability to 
distinguish the two hypotheses - especially given the financial crisis and stock price collapse 
in the middle of our sample period.     
32  The Korea Securities Finance Corporation, established in October 1955, is the sole 
provider of securities finance services in Korea under the Securities and Exchange Act. 
33 According to an article in Munhwa Ilbo (March 4, 1998), some brokerage firms increased 
their collateral requirements to 200 percent or more.  Ssang Yong Securities Company, for 
example, increased its requirement to 250 percent. 
34 Munhwa Ilbo (March 4, 1998). 
35 For our sample, the correlation coefficient between AdvCost-Buy and Volat is 0.739 while 
it is 0.675 between AdvCost-Sell and Volat. 
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Table I 
Distribution of Orders and Trades 
 
This table reports the distribution of orders submitted and trades executed in the Korea Stock 
Exchange (KSE) during the period December 1996 – December 2000.  Buy and sell orders are 
partitioned into market and limit orders.  Investors are classified as domestic individual investors, 
domestic institutional investors, and foreign investors.   Each daily trading session is partitioned into 
the opening call market auction and the continuous trading during the rest of trading hours.  Values in 
parentheses are average order sizes in shares in Panels A and B, and average trade sizes in Panel C. 
 
Panel A: Distribution of Buy Orders Submitted 
Investor Type Order Type 
Opening  
Call Market 
Rest of Day 
Continuous 
Market Entire Day 
Market 3,462,466 (1,054.44) 
8,678,562 
(1,221.05) 
12,141,208 
(1,173.54) 
Limit 46,596,656 (1,169.03) 
197,009,332 
(1,231.02) 
243,605,988 
(1,218.26) 
Domestic 
Individual 
Total 50,059,122 (1,161.57) 
205,687,894 
(1,230.60) 
255,747,016 
(1,217.09) 
     
Market 104,187 (1,777.17) 
1,113,798 
(1,038.34) 
1,217,985 
(1,101.54) 
Limit 585,118 (6,862.06) 
5,598,581 
(3,760.60) 
6,183,699 
(4,054.07) 
Domestic 
Institutional 
Total 689,305 (6,093.49) 
6,712,379 
(3,308.89) 
7,401,684 
(3,568.22) 
     
Market 53,474 (2,468.17) 
526,211 
(1,331.09) 
579,685 
(1,435.98) 
Limit 246,740 (3,361.41) 
3,317,035 
(1,883.88) 
3,563,775 
(1,986.18) Foreign 
Total 300,214 (3,202.30) 
3,843,246 
(1,808.19) 
4,143,460 
(1,909.20) 
     
Market 3,620,127 (1,096.11) 
10,318,122 
(1,205.92) 
13,938,249 
(1,177.40) 
Limit 47,428,384 (1,251.10) 
205,873,390 
(1,309.54) 
253,301,774 
(1,298.60) All 
Total 51,048,511 (1,240.11) 
216,191,512 
(1,304.60) 
267,240,023 
(1,292.28) 
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Panel B: Distribution of Sell Orders Submitted 
Investor Type Order Type 
Opening  
Call Market 
Rest of Day 
Continuous 
Market Entire Day 
Market 6,732,424 (606.50) 
11,173,446 
(746.62) 
17,905,870 
(693.94) 
Limit 51,422,932 (1,153.35) 
201,169,307 
(1,766.00) 
252,592,239 
(1,641.28) 
Domestic 
Individual 
Total 58,155,356 (1,090.05) 
212,342,753 
(1,712.36) 
270,498,109 
(1,578.56) 
     
Market 190,256 (1,142.47) 
1,329,346 
(762.77) 
1,519,602 
(810.31) 
Limit 985,626 (6,433.11) 
6,411,346 
(4,199.12) 
7,396,972 
(4,496.80) 
Domestic 
Institutional 
Total 1,175,882 (5,577.09) 
7,740,692 
(3,608.98) 
8,916,574 
(3,868.53) 
     
Market 43,388 (1,948.78) 
413,493 
(1,262.65) 
456,881 
(1,327.81) 
Limit 216,188 (3,714.74) 
3,400,153 
(2,380.34) 
3,616,341 
(2,460.11) Foreign 
Total 259,576 (3,419.56) 
3,813,646 
(2,259.16) 
4,073,222 
(2,333.10) 
     
Market 6,966,032 (628.91) 
12,914,374 
(764.04) 
19,880,406 
(716.69) 
Limit 53,011,848 (1,254.08) 
210,819,707 
(1,849.31) 
263,831,555 
(1,729.71) All 
Total 59,977,880 (1,181.47) 
223,734,081 
(1,786.66) 
283,711,961 
(1,658.72) 
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Panel C: Distribution of Trade Records 
Investor Type Order Direction 
Opening  
Call Market 
Rest of Day 
Continuous 
Market Entire Day 
Buy 14,774,259 (374.78) 
335,213,043 
(442.93) 
349,987,302 
(440.05) Domestic 
Individual Sell 14,677,872 (372.70) 
332,549,722 
(440.33) 
347,227,594 
(437.47) 
     
Buy 440,944 (804.29) 
25,256,326 
(616.26) 
25,697,320 
(619.49) Domestic 
Institutional Sell 645,917 (711.19) 
28,185,855 
(624.28) 
28,831,772 
(626.22) 
     
Buy 399,194 (513.00) 
11,036,713 
(484.25) 
11,435,907 
(485.25) Foreign 
Sell 290,658 (574.70) 
10,770,505 
(497.39) 
11,061,163 
(499.42) 
     
Buy 15,614,447 (390.43) 
371,506,082 
(455.93) 
387,120,529 
(453.29) All 
Sell 15,614,447 (390.43) 
371,506,082 
(455.93) 
387,120,529 
(453.29) 
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Table II 
Elasticity of Demand and Supply 
 
This table reports the elasticity of demand and supply during the period December 1996 – December 
2000.  Each trading day is partitioned into two sessions: opening auction and rest of trading hours.  
For each firm and each trading session, the daily elasticity is estimated using the following regression: 
jkjkjjjk dp εβα ++= ; where jkp  and jkd  represent the normalized price and normalized 
market-wide cumulative quantity at tick point k for firm j on a given trading day. The daily elasticity 
is defined as the inverse of slope coefficient (i.e., jj βη 1= ).  Then, the daily elasticity measures 
are averaged across all firms.  The sample period is divided into three sub-periods: (a) pre-crisis 
period (December 1996 – October 1997), (b) in-crisis period (November 1997 – October 1998), and 
(c) post-crisis period (November 1998 – December 2000).   
 
Panel A: Elasticity of Demand 
Trading Session Sub-Period N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Opening auction Entire sample period 1,090   9.26   8.62 2.79 
 Pre-crisis period    265 13.27 13.30 0.70 
 In-crisis period    293   9.58   9.23 1.81 
 Post-crisis period    532   7.08   6.91 0.99 
      
Rest of trading hours Entire sample period 1,090 10.28   8.85 3.50 
 Pre-crisis period    265 15.52 15.58 1.73 
 In-crisis period    293   9.91   9.64 2.38 
 Post-crisis period    532   7.86   7.80 0.95 
      
Panel B: Elasticity of Supply 
Trading Session Sub-Period N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Opening auction Entire sample period 1,090   9.06   8.36 3.02 
 Pre-crisis period    265 13.30 13.61 1.08 
 In-crisis period    293   9.62   9.21 1.98 
 Post-crisis period    532   6.64   6.44 0.96 
      
Rest of trading hours Entire sample period 1,090   9.30   8.06 3.02 
 Pre-crisis period    265 13.56 13.80 1.63 
 In-crisis period    293   9.09   8.64 2.50 
 Post-crisis period    532   7.30   7.23 0.90 
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Table III 
Proportion of Cancelled/Revised Orders and Potential Shifts in Demand and Supply 
Curves 
 
For each trading day, we divide the sample into five quintiles based on the portion of orders that are 
either cancelled or revised.  Quintile 1 (Quintile 5) includes observations for which this proportion is 
the smallest (largest).  Then, the elasticity for the opening auction is regressed on the elasticity for the 
rest of trading hours using the daily average elasticity measures.  Values in parentheses represent t-
statistics which are adjusted for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity using the generalized method 
of moments (GMM) with the Newey-West (1989) procedure. 
 
Panel A: Elasticity of Demand 
 Intercept Slope Coefficient Adj. R2 
Mean Value of 
Cancelled/Revised 
Proportions 
Quintile 1 (smallest) 0.018 1.054 82.07% 12.08% 
 (0.26) (33.82)   
Quintile 2 0.055 1.026 84.26% 20.67% 
 (1.16) (46.19)   
Quintile 3 0.084 0.997 83.51% 25.52% 
 (1.76) (43.86)   
Quintile 4 0.172 0.934 83.25% 31.07% 
 (3.81) (42.89)   
Quintile 5 (largest) 0.180 0.901 83.33% 44.22% 
 (4.09) (42.72)   
Entire Sample 0.094 0.985 86.57% 26.63% 
  (2.12) (47.04)   
     
Panel B: Elasticity of Supply 
 Intercept Slope Coefficient Adj. R2 
Mean Value of 
Cancelled/Revised 
Proportion 
Quintile 1 (smallest)  0.186  0.962 81.92% 8.54% 
   (2.57) (29.35)   
Quintile 2  0.389  0.846 77.27% 16.68% 
   (8.34) (38.48)   
Quintile 3  0.449  0.806 77.15% 20.86% 
 (10.27) (39.83)   
Quintile 4  0.489  0.776 78.22% 25.05% 
 (12.25) (40.15)   
Quintile 5 (largest)  0.404  0.794 82.36% 33.59% 
 (10.22) (40.91)   
Entire Sample  0.377  0.836 81.74% 20.09% 
    (9.43) (44.83)    
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Table IV 
Investor Classes and Elasticity of Demand and Supply 
 
This table reports the elasticity of demand and supply for the trading session following the opening 
auction (i.e., rest of trading hours) during the period December 1996 – December 2000.  Investors are 
classified as domestic individuals (Individual), domestic institutions (Institution), and foreign 
investors (Foreign).  For each firm and each investor type, the daily elasticity is estimated using the 
following regression: jkjkjjjk dp εβα ++= ; where jkp  and jkd  represent the normalized 
price and normalized cumulative quantity demanded by the investor class at tick point k for firm j on a 
given trading day.  The daily elasticity is defined as the inverse of slope coefficient (i.e., 
jj βη 1= ). Then, the daily elasticity measures are averaged across all firms.  The sample period 
is divided into three sub-periods: (a) pre-crisis period (December 1996 – October 1997), (b) in-crisis 
period (November 1997 – October 1998), and (c) post-crisis period (November 1998 – December 
2000). 
 
Panel A: Elasticity of Demand 
Sub-period Investor class N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Entire sample period Individual 1,090 10.44   8.96 3.59 
 Institution 1,090 18.90 18.88 5.00 
 Foreign 1,090 21.77 21.46 6.07 
      
Pre-crisis period Individual    265 15.83 15.93 1.72 
 Institution    265 22.63 22.54 3.58 
 Foreign    265 22.00 21.23 6.48 
      
In-crisis period Individual    293 10.07   9.78 2.47 
 Institution    293 18.67 18.44 4.71 
 Foreign    293 20.16 19.49 5.91 
      
Post-crisis period Individual    532   7.96   7.90 0.96 
 Institution    532 17.17 16.26 4.77 
 Foreign    532 22.55 22.40 5.77 
      
Panel B: Elasticity of Supply 
Sub-period Investor class N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Entire sample period Individual 1,090   9.32   8.10 3.01 
 Institution 1,090 19.59 19.24 5.32 
 Foreign 1,090 21.55 21.26 5.58 
      
Pre-crisis period Individual    265 13.52 13.74 1.62 
 Institution    265 24.25 24.34 3.76 
 Foreign    265 22.22 21.39 5.07 
      
In-crisis period Individual    293   9.15   8.64 2.59 
 Institution    293 19.07 18.59 4.55 
 Foreign    293 20.18 20.12 5.86 
      
Post-crisis period Individual    532   7.32   7.26 0.90 
 Institution    532 17.55 16.47 4.94 
 Foreign    532 21.98 21.75 5.53 
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Table V 
Summary Statistics for Potential Determinants of Elasticity 
 
This table reports the summary statistics for the time series of daily average of each variable for 
different periods. AdvCost is the adverse selection component of the spread, relative to the mid-point 
of bid and ask prices of buy (sell) orders.  The adverse selection cost is calculated for buy orders and 
sell orders separately.  Volat is the standard deviation of returns over the trading day where returns are 
measured using the bid-ask mid-point in 5-minute intervals.  Volume is the daily trading volume 
divided by the number of shares outstanding.  Mrg is the ratio of margin buy orders to total buy orders 
submitted while Sht is the ratio of short sale orders to total sell orders submitted.  The sample period 
is divided into three sub-periods: (a) pre-crisis period (December 1996 – October 1997), (b) in-crisis 
period (November 1997 – October 1998), and (c) post-crisis period (November 1998 – December 
2000) 
 
Sub-period Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Entire sample period AdvCost-Buy (%) 1,090   0.853   0.751 0.348 
 AdvCost-Sell (%) 1,090   1.087   0.931 0.482 
 Volat (%) 1,090   0.661   0.638 0.165 
 Volume (%) 1,090   1.631   1.389 0.988 
 Mrg (%) 1,090   7.123   2.665 8.305 
 
 
Sht (%)      1090   0.155   0.004 0.264 
Pre-crisis period AdvCost-Buy (%)    265   0.755   0.661 0.236 
 AdvCost-Sell (%)    265   0.917   0.812 0.305 
 Volat (%)    265   0.542   0.519 0.113 
 Volume (%)    265   0.773   0.787 0.192 
 Mrg (%)    265 20.364 20.234 2.879 
 
 
Sht (%)         265   0.481   0.428 0.241 
In-crisis period AdvCost-Buy (%)    293   1.253   1.197 0.331 
 AdvCost-Sell (%)    293   1.625   1.519 0.525 
 Volat (%)    293   0.802   0.782 0.158 
 Volume (%)    293   0.991   0.957 0.329 
 Mrg (%)    293   5.748   3.179 5.034 
 Sht (%) 
 
        293   0.140   0.025 0.260 
Post-crisis period AdvCost-Buy (%)    532   0.682   0.650 0.197 
 AdvCost-Sell (%)    532   0.875   0.836 0.244 
 Volat (%)    532   0.644   0.618 0.130 
 Volume (%)    532   2.411   2.251 0.849 
 
 
Mrg (%) 
Sht (%)                      
 
   532 
   532 
  1.284 
  0.000 
  0.987 
  0.000 
0.846 
0.001 
 49
Table VI 
Time-Series Regression Results for Determinants of Elasticity 
 
This table reports the time-series regression results for the determinants of elasticity.  The elasticity is 
measured by using orders submitted during the session following the opening auction (i.e., the rest of 
trading hours).  The sample period is divided into three sub-periods: (a) pre-crisis period (December 
1996 – October 1997), (b) in-crisis period (November 1997 – October 1998), and (c) post-crisis 
period (November 1998 – December 2000).  The determinants of elasticity are examined using the 
following regressions: 
ttttt tbMrgbVolumebAdvCostbb εη +++++= 54310  
ttttt tbMrgbVolumebVolatbb υη +++++= 54320  
ηt is the magnitude of elasticity on trading day t.  AdvCostt is the adverse selection component of 
spread.  Volatt is the standard deviation of returns over the trading day where returns are measured 
using the bid-ask mid-point in 5-minute intervals.  Volumet is the daily trading volume divided by the 
number of shares outstanding.  Mrgt is the ratio of margin-buy orders to total buy orders.  All 
variables are averaged across all firms to obtain the daily aggregate measures.  Then, they are 
transformed by adding a value of one and then by taking natural logarithms.  t is the trend variable.    
Values in parentheses represent t-statistics which are adjusted for serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity using the generalized method of moments (GMM) with the Newey-West (1989) 
procedure. 
 
Panel A: Elasticity of Demand 
 Entire sample 
period 
Pre-crisis period In-crisis period Post-crisis period 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
No. of 
days 
     1,090      1,090         265         265         293         293         532         532 
Intercept  
     3.290 
 (21.51) 
     3.086 
 (25.05) 
     3.904 
 (11.50) 
     2.886 
 (13.66) 
     0.741 
   (1.22) 
     1.704 
   (2.60) 
     1.449 
   (1.66) 
     2.197 
   (2.56) 
AdvCost     -0.541 (-10.32) 
     -0.884 
  (-7.24) 
    -0.540 
  (-6.35) 
    -0.470 
  (-5.80) 
 
Volat      -0.912 (-13.12) 
     -1.034 
  (-7.54) 
     -0.919 
  (-5.11) 
     -0.722 
  (-8.36) 
Volume     -0.375   (-7.34) 
   -0.244 
  (-6.86) 
    -0.495 
  (-7.13) 
    -0.252 
  (-3.31) 
   -0.760 
  (-6.34) 
    -0.643 
  (-6.01) 
    -0.194 
  (-3.52) 
   -0.084 
  (-1.81) 
Mrg      0.108    (5.18) 
     0.135 
   (7.84) 
     0.024 
   (0.33) 
     0.189 
   (2.93) 
     0.166 
   (3.38) 
     0.141 
   (3.38) 
     0.286 
   (4.45) 
     0.204 
   (3.00) 
t 
    -0.069 
  (-4.96) 
   -0.040 
  (-3.37) 
    -0.088 
  (-4.57) 
    -0.016 
  (-1.61) 
     0.381 
   (4.10) 
     0.232 
   (2.53) 
     0.147 
   (1.25) 
     0.042 
   (0.35) 
2. RAdj      
82.44% 
    
83.53% 
    
36.52% 
    
32.09% 
    
35.54% 
    
38.01% 
    
51.92% 
    
58.29% 
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Panel B: Elasticity of Supply 
 Entire sample  
period 
Pre-crisis period In-crisis period Post-crisis period 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 
2 
Model 
1 
Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
No. of 
days 
     1,090      1,090         265         
265 
        
293 
        293         532         532 
Intercept 
     2.875 
  (19.09) 
     2.432 
 (20.16) 
     3.351 
  (11.38) 
   1.595 
  (6.88) 
 1.670 
 (2.15) 
    -0.368 
  (-0.44) 
     1.644 
   (1.99) 
     1.656 
   (1.78) 
AdvCost 
   -0.484 
  (-9.14) 
     -0.966 
  (-8.54) 
   -0.616 
 (-5.72) 
    -0.489 
 (-6.63) 
 
Volat 
     -0.516 
  (-7.39) 
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Figure 1: Time-Series Pattern of KOSPI index 
 
This figure plots the time-series pattern of the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) 
during the period December 1996 – December 2000. 
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Figure 2: Time-Series Patterns of Demand Elasticities 
This figure plots the cross-sectional averages of demand elasticities for the opening auction 
and the rest of trading hours. 
(a) Opening auction 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
01
/1
2/
19
96
01
/0
3/
19
97
01
/0
6/
19
97
01
/0
9/
19
97
01
/1
2/
19
97
01
/0
3/
19
98
01
/0
6/
19
98
01
/0
9/
19
98
01
/1
2/
19
98
01
/0
3/
19
99
01
/0
6/
19
99
01
/0
9/
19
99
01
/1
2/
19
99
01
/0
3/
20
00
01
/0
6/
20
00
01
/0
9/
20
00
01
/1
2/
20
00
 
 
Time-Series Patterns of Average Elasticity for Demand Curves 
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(b) Rest of the Day 
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                          Time-Series Pattern of Average Elasticity for Demand Curves  
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Figure 3: Time-Series Patterns of Supply Elasticities 
This figure plots the cross-sectional averages of supply elasticities for the opening auction 
and the rest of trading hours. 
(a) Opening auction 
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Time-Series Pattern of Average Elasticity for Supply Curves 
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(b) Rest-of-the-Day Supply Curves 
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Time-Series Pattern of Average Elasticity for Supply Curves 
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Figure 4: Demand and Supply Elasticities by Investor Type (Unrestricted Sample) 
This figure plots the time-series patterns of demand and supply elasticities of three investor 
classes: (1) domestic individual investors, (2) domestic institutional investors, and (3) foreign 
investors. 
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(b) Supply Elasticities 
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Figure 5: Demand and Supply Elasticities by Investor Type (Restricted Sample) 
This figure plots the time-series patterns of demand and supply elasticities by investor type 
using a restricted sample of firm-days that have elasticity measures for all three investor 
types: (1) domestic individual investors, (2) domestic institutional investors, and (3) foreign 
investors. 
(a) Demand Elasticities 
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(b) Supply Elasticities 
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Figure 6: Time-Series Patterns of Potential Determinants of Elasticities 
This figure plots cross-sectional averages of potential determinants of demand and supply 
elasticities over the sample period. 
(a) Adverse Selection Component of the Spread (Buy Orders) 
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(b) Adverse Selection Component of the Spread (Sell Orders) 
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(c) Intraday Volatility (%) 
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(d) Daily Share Turnover (%) 
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(e) Ratio of Margin Buying Orders to Total Buy Orders (%) 
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(f) Ratio of Short Sale Orders to Total Sell Orders (%) 
 
 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
01
/1
2/
19
96
01
/0
3/
19
97
01
/0
6/
19
97
01
/0
9/
19
97
01
/1
2/
19
97
01
/0
3/
19
98
01
/0
6/
19
98
01
/0
9/
19
98
01
/1
2/
19
98
01
/0
3/
19
99
01
/0
6/
19
99
01
/0
9/
19
99
01
/1
2/
19
99
01
/0
3/
20
00
01
/0
6/
20
00
01
/0
9/
20
00
01
/1
2/
20
00
 
 
 
 
